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Title: Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption cases
Authors: Landsberg, David
Supervisors: Hawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
Keywords: Causation
Issue Date: 16-Oct-2009
Abstract: Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.
Type: Thesis
Publisher: University of St Andrews
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Theses

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