Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption cases
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Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
Embargo Date: Electronic copy restricted until 21st July 2015
Embargo Reason: Thesis restricted in accordance with University regulations
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