Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption cases
There are no files associated with this item.
MetadataShow full item record
Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
Embargo Date: Electronic copy restricted until 21st July 2015
Embargo Reason: Thesis restricted in accordance with University regulations
Items in the St Andrews Research Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.