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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorMotchenkova, Evgenia
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-21T10:10:15Z
dc.date.available2016-01-21T10:10:15Z
dc.date.issued2015-12-21
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y , Motchenkova , E & Ulph , D T 2015 ' Measuring the effectiveness of anti-cartel interventions : a conceptual framework ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1602 , University of St Andrews , St Andrews , pp. 1-44 .en
dc.identifier.issn0962-4031
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 240407275
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3daaeb6b-4782-4c99-9ce9-2d9f02b1fb12
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464503
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/8052
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalising cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the short-term, immediately following successful prosecution; (c) actions that aim to prevent the re-emergence of prosecuted cartels in the longer term. The last two intervention activities have not been analysed in the existing literature. In addition we take account of the structure and toughness of penalties. In this framework the enforcement activity of a CA causes industries in which cartels form to oscillate between periods of competitive pricing and periods of cartel pricing. We determine the impact of CA activity on deterred, impeded, and suffered harm. We derive measures of both the total and the marginal effects on welfare resulting from competition authority interventions and show how these break down into measures of the Direct Effect of interventions (i.e. the effect due to cartel activity being impeded) and two Indirect/Behavioural Effects – on Deterrence and Pricing. Finally, we calibrate the model and estimate the fraction of the harm that CAs remove as well as the magnitude of total and marginal welfare effects of anti-cartel interventions.
dc.format.extent44
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paperen
dc.rights(c) Copyright 2016 The authorsen
dc.subjectAntitrust Enforcementen
dc.subjectAntitrust Lawen
dc.subjectcartelen
dc.subjectoligopolyen
dc.subjectrepeated gamesen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleMeasuring the effectiveness of anti-cartel interventions : a conceptual frameworken
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.urlhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/san/wpecon/1602.htmlen


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