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dc.contributor.authorRead, Stephen
dc.contributor.editorKlima, Gyula
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-05T10:10:57Z
dc.date.available2016-01-05T10:10:57Z
dc.date.issued2014-12
dc.identifier.citationRead , S 2014 , Concepts and meaning in medieval philosophy . in G Klima (ed.) , Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy . Medieval Philosophy: Texts and Studies , Fordham University Press , New York , pp. 9-28 .en
dc.identifier.isbn9780823262748
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 348792
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: f5f48fee-cd44-4fcf-bad9-5bf340507b86
dc.identifier.otherstandrews_research_output: 15095
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84951839696
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-2181-2609/work/62668505
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000351523300002
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/7961
dc.description.abstractIn his recent study, Concepts, Fodor identifies five nonnegotiable constraints on any theory of concepts. These theses were all shared by the standard medieval theories of concepts. However, those theories were cognitivist, in contrast with Fodor’s: concepts are definitions, a form of natural knowledge. The medieval theories were formed under two influences, from Aristotle by way of Boethius, and from Augustine. The tension between them resulted in the Ockhamist notion of a natural language, concepts as signs. Thus conventional signs, spoken and written, signify things in the world by the mediation of concepts which themselves form a language of thought, signifying those things naturally by their similarity. Indeed, later thinkers realised that everything signifies itself and what is like it naturally in a broad sense by means of the concept of its natural likeness.
dc.format.extent20
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherFordham University Press
dc.relation.ispartofIntentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophyen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMedieval Philosophy: Texts and Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright 2014 Fordham University Press. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://fordhampress.com/index.php/intentionaity-cognition-and-menta-representation-in-medieva-phiosophy-cloth.htmlen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleConcepts and meaning in medieval philosophyen
dc.typeBook itemen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. St Andrews Institute of Medieval Studiesen


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