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dc.contributor.authorCotnoir, A.J.
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-12T00:11:50Z
dc.date.available2015-12-12T00:11:50Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationCotnoir , A J 2014 , ' Universalism and junk ' Australasian Journal of Philosophy , vol. 92 , no. 4 , pp. 649-664 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.924540en
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 158988845
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: d68b1938-a555-4b89-81ef-eb5ec36e1a1d
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84911401035
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000344398100003
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/7909
dc.description.abstractThose who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the junk argument due to Bohn [2009], which proceeds from (i) the incompatibility of junk with universalism and (ii) the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on (ii); however, recent authors have cast doubt on (i). This paper undertakes a defence of premise (i) against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the effect that Bohn's defence of that premise presupposes far too much. I show that one can defend premise (i) from a much weaker set of assumptions. The second objection, due to Contessa [2012], is that those who accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums (which are compatible with junk) rather than infinitary fusions. I argue that this conception of unrestricted composition is problematic: it is in conflict with an intuitive remainder principle. The final objection is due to Spencer [2012]. His view is that there is no absolutely unrestricted plural universal quantifier; so any statement of the unrestricted fusion axiom will simply not rule out the existence of junky worlds. I argue that the failure of unrestricted quantification will not be enough by itself to establish the existence of junk. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this view counts as a form of mereological universalism. As a result, I suggest that if one wants to reject the junk argument, premise (ii) is the only viable option.
dc.format.extent16
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofAustralasian Journal of Philosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright 2014 Australasian Association of Philosophy. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Association of Philosophy on 12/6/2014, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00048402.2014.924540en
dc.subjectJunken
dc.subjectMereologyen
dc.subjectUniversalismen
dc.subjectExtensionalityen
dc.subjectUnrestricted quantificationen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleUniversalism and junken
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.The University of St Andrewsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.924540
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2015-12-12


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