Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorRead, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-28T10:10:01Z
dc.date.available2015-09-28T10:10:01Z
dc.date.issued2015-09
dc.identifier.citationRead , S 2015 , ' Richard Kilvington and the theory of obligations ' Vivarium , vol. 53 , no. 3 , pp. 391-404 . DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341306en
dc.identifier.issn0042-7543
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 171453389
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3886c0c5-7520-49ed-b1ad-b89f1ea08a10
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84942427581
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/7552
dc.description.abstractKretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretation, realising that the reason for Kilvington’s revision was precisely that he found the art of obligation unsuited to the kind of reasoning which lay at the heart of the sophismatic argument. In his criticism, Kilvington focussed on a technique used by Walter Burley to force a respondent to grant an arbitrary falsehood and similar to Lewis and Langford’s famous defence of ex impossibili quodlibet. Kilvington observes that just as in obligational disputation, one may be obliged to grant a false proposition and deny a true one, so in counterfactual reasoning one may be obliged to doubt a proposition whose truth or falsity one knows, on pain of contradiction.en
dc.format.extent15en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofVivariumen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2015 Brill. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341306en
dc.subjectObligationsen
dc.subjectSophismsen
dc.subjectEx impossibili quodlibeten
dc.subjectKilvingtonen
dc.subjectBurleyen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleRichard Kilvington and the theory of obligationsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. St Andrews Institute of Mediaeval Studiesen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341306
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record