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dc.contributor.advisorTimmermann, Jens
dc.contributor.authorSticker, Martin
dc.coverage.spatial267en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-11T15:12:25Z
dc.date.available2015-09-11T15:12:25Z
dc.date.issued2015-11-30
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/7445
dc.description.abstractIn my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant’s ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant’s claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant’s method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subjectKanten_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.subjectMethodologyen_US
dc.subjectMoral-psychologyen_US
dc.subjectCommon human reasonen_US
dc.subjectSelf-deceptionen_US
dc.subject.lccB2799.E8S85
dc.subject.lcshKant, Immanuel, 1724-1804--Ethicsen_US
dc.subject.lcshPsychology and philosophyen_US
dc.subject.lcshReasonen_US
dc.subject.lcshSelf-deceptionen_US
dc.titleCommon human reason in Kant : a study in Kant’s moral psychology and philosophical methoden_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.rights.embargodatePrint and electronic copy restricted until 14th August 2020en_US
dc.rights.embargoreasonThesis restricted in accordance with University regulationsen_US


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