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Parts as counterparts
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dc.contributor.author | Cotnoir, Aaron | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-08-31T23:10:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-31T23:10:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-09 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Cotnoir , A 2013 , ' Parts as counterparts ' , Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , vol. 2 , no. 3 , pp. 228-241 . https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.78 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 2161-2234 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE: 166206358 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE UUID: e3710bff-60bc-4cf8-ae0d-e99ab427d932 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0003-4528-7570/work/65702607 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7377 | |
dc.description | Date of Acceptance: 22/10/2013 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Mereological nihilists are faced with a difficult challenge: explaining ordinary talk about material objects. Popular paraphrase strategies involve plurals, arrangements of particles, or fictions. In this paper, a new paraphrase strategy is put forward that has distinct advantages over its rivals: it is compatible with gunk and emergent properties of macro-objects. The only assumption is a commitment to a liberal view of the nature of simples; the nihilist must be willing to accept the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples. The author suggests reinterpreting the parthood and composition relations as modal. According to this paraphrase, composition is a kind of counterpart relation. The author shows that one can accept that mereological nihilism is metaphysically necessary, while endorsing all the claims of classical mereology. As a result, the nihilists are in exactly the same position as the classical mereologist when it comes to explaining talk about ordinary objects, but without the additional ontology. | |
dc.format.extent | 14 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy | en |
dc.rights | This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cotnoir, A. J. (2013), Parts as counterparts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2: 228–24, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tht3.78/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving | en |
dc.subject | Mereology | en |
dc.subject | Nihilism | en |
dc.subject | Paraphrase | en |
dc.subject | Composition | en |
dc.subject | Simples | en |
dc.subject | Gunk | en |
dc.subject | Parts | en |
dc.subject | Counterparts | en |
dc.subject | Emergent properties | en |
dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | en |
dc.subject.lcc | B1 | en |
dc.title | Parts as counterparts | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.description.version | Postprint | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.78 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.embargoedUntil | 2015-09-01 |
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