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dc.contributor.advisorBall, Derek Nelson
dc.contributor.advisorHawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
dc.contributor.authorCole, Marc William
dc.coverage.spatial126en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-23T13:40:18Z
dc.date.available2015-04-23T13:40:18Z
dc.date.issued2015-06-25
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6551
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation, I argue that David Lewis' abductive argument for Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) has the unwelcome, and hidden, implication of being unable to accommodate agent causation theories of free will. This is because of his formulation of plenitude, which basically says that every way that a world or a part of a world could be is the way that some world, or part of some world is. This formulation tacitly assumes that chance and nomological principles are sufficient to account for everything that happens at worlds. However, agent causation theories argue that free will is neither reducible to chance nor determined by physics. My argument recasts a fork argument made by Andrew Beedle. I proceed by arguing that chance-based principles evince an ontologically distinct kind of modality than agent causation principles. However, plenitude only accounts for the physics/chance-based kind of modality. There is no similar principle of plenitude that can be given for agential modality that does not collapse into the chance-based principle. But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate the doctrine in GMR that claims worlds are causally isolated. If no agential plenitude principle can be found and there is agential modality, then plenitude fails. If there is no agency at our world, and Lewis’ original formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any world. This is the fork: If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails, or isolation fails. But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any possible world. The latter prong is too strong a claim for an abductive argument like GMR. The former proves that GMR cannot accommodate agent-causation theories. GMR loses its neutrality either way, to its detriment.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation'On the plurality of worlds', by David Lewis (1986)en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectDavid Lewisen_US
dc.subjectModalityen_US
dc.subjectPossible worldsen_US
dc.subjectProtagorasen_US
dc.subjectPlatoen_US
dc.subjectTuche/techne antithesisen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectAgency/free willen_US
dc.subject.lccB945.L4554C7
dc.subject.lcshLewis, David K. (David Kellogg), 1941-2001en_US
dc.subject.lcshModality (Logic)en_US
dc.subject.lcshPlurality of worldsen_US
dc.subject.lcshProtagorasen_US
dc.subject.lcshPlatoen_US
dc.subject.lcshMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subject.lcshFree will and determinismen_US
dc.titleThe agential fork : the hidden consequences of agency for plenitude in David Lewis' thesis of genuine modal realismen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhil Master of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentUniversity of Stirlingen_US


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