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dc.contributor.authorCotnoir, Aaron
dc.date.accessioned2015-03-09T17:01:01Z
dc.date.available2015-03-09T17:01:01Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationCotnoir , A 2015 , ' Abelian mereology ' Logic and Logical Philosophy . https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2015.006en
dc.identifier.issn1425-3305
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 166207443
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 010d301c-ea0c-4e5c-bf3c-1b5d23a2d737
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84962124374
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000410166600002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6197
dc.descriptionDate of Acceptance: 01/12/2015en
dc.description.abstractIn classical extensional mereology, composition is idempotent: if x is part of y, then the sum of x and y is identical to y. In this paper, I provide a systematic and coherent formal mereology for which idempotence fails. I first discuss a number of purported counterexamples to idempotence that have been put forward in the literature. I then discuss two recent attempts at sketching non-idempotent formal mereology due to Karen Bennett and Kit Fine. I argue that these attempts are incomplete, however, and there are many open issues left unresolved. I then construct a class of models of a non-idempotent mereology using multiset theory, consider their algebraic structure, and show how these models can shed light on the open issues left from the previous approaches.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofLogic and Logical Philosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2015 Logic and Logical Philosophy. This article is covered by a Creative Commons No-Derivatives licence (CC BY-ND). Licence details can be found here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/en
dc.subjectUniversalismen
dc.subjectExtensionalityen
dc.subjectSupplementationen
dc.subjectAntisymmetryen
dc.subjectMereologyen
dc.subjectParthooden
dc.subjectCompositionen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleAbelian mereologyen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2015.006
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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