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dc.contributor.authorBradford, Elisabeth E.F.
dc.contributor.authorJentzsch, Ines
dc.contributor.authorGomez, Juan-Carlos
dc.identifier.citationBradford , E E F , Jentzsch , I & Gomez , J-C 2015 , ' From self to social cognition : Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning ' , Cognition , vol. 138 , pp. 21-34 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 164995538
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 1e4d226f-80fc-415a-8834-4bca7cbbaf30
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84922967980
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000352173400003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5621-1024/work/64360896
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-0218-9834/work/64361108
dc.descriptionThis work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/J500136/1] in the form of a three-year PhD studentship awarded to Elisabeth Bradford.en
dc.description.abstract‘Theory of Mind’ refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism could be distinguished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attribution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF, within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that ‘perspective-shift’ requirements (i.e. changing from adoption of the ‘self’ perspective to the perspective of the ‘other’, or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were significantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self. It is suggested that the ‘self’ forms the stem of understanding the ‘other’, and is therefore processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the ‘other’ perspective is only processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person’s perspective, even when their belief state is matched to one’s own, requires more cognitive effort than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states.
dc.rightsCopyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (
dc.subjectTheory of Minden
dc.subjectFalse beliefen
dc.subjectBelief attributionen
dc.subjectSocial cognitionen
dc.subjectBF Psychologyen
dc.titleFrom self to social cognition : Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioningen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Psychology and Neuroscienceen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Institute of Behavioural and Neural Sciencesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Social Learning & Cognitive Evolutionen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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