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dc.contributor.advisorWheeler, Michael
dc.contributor.advisorProsser, Simon
dc.contributor.authorWelch, Brett
dc.coverage.spatial211en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-30T13:18:09Z
dc.date.available2015-01-30T13:18:09Z
dc.date.issued2014-01-30
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6043
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subjectSelfen_US
dc.subjectSelfhooden_US
dc.subjectMinimal selfen_US
dc.subjectPhenomenologyen_US
dc.subjectEnactivismen_US
dc.subjectEmbodied cognitionen_US
dc.subject4Een_US
dc.subjectAffectsen_US
dc.subjectSubjectivityen_US
dc.subjectSensorimotor couplingen_US
dc.subjectEmotionsen_US
dc.subjectFeelingsen_US
dc.subjectMoodsen_US
dc.subjectBodyen_US
dc.subjectProprioceptionen_US
dc.subjectBody schemaen_US
dc.subjectKinaesthesiaen_US
dc.subjectVitality dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectBody imageen_US
dc.subjectDual process theoryen_US
dc.subjectNested neural hierarchyen_US
dc.subjectGesturingen_US
dc.subjectInfant developmenten_US
dc.subjectMirror neuronsen_US
dc.subjectCenter of narrative gravityen_US
dc.subjectEnactiveen_US
dc.subject.lccBD438.5W4
dc.subject.lcshSelf (Philosophy)en_US
dc.subject.lcshPhenomenologyen_US
dc.subject.lcshMind and bodyen_US
dc.titleA phenomenological-enactive theory of the minimal selfen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentThe University of Stirlingen_US


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