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dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.contributor.authorUlph, Alistair
dc.identifier.citationUlph , D T & Ulph , A 2014 ' Consumption decisions when people value conformity ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1414 , University of St Andrews , pp. 1-29 .en
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 155825228
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 76f72b70-bfa4-4a70-b07d-cf1e6f3df24e
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464534
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we assume that for some commodities individuals may wish to adjust their levels of consumption from their normal Marshallian levels so as to match the consumption levels of a group of other individuals, in order to signal that they conform to the consumption norms of that group. Unlike Veblen’s concept of conspicuous consumption this can mean that some individuals may reduce their consumption of the relevant commodities. We model this as a three-stage game in which individuals first decide whether or not they wish to adhere to a norm, then decide which norm they wish to adhere to, and finally decide their actual consumption. We present a number of examples of the resulting equilibria, and then discuss the potential policy implications of this model.
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paperen
dc.rights(c) the author 2014en
dc.subjectstrength of adherence to normsen
dc.subjectdesire for conformityen
dc.subjectnorm-consistent consumption intervalen
dc.subjectparticipation-consistent consumption intervalen
dc.subjectNash equilibrium of three-stage gameen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.titleConsumption decisions when people value conformityen
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen

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