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dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.contributor.authorSlack, Sean Edward
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-20T15:31:30Z
dc.date.available2014-10-20T15:31:30Z
dc.date.issued2014-08-03
dc.identifier.citationUlph , D T & Slack , S E 2014 ' Optimal universal and categorical benefits with classification errors and imperfect enforcement ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1411 , University of St Andrews , pp. 1-34 .en
dc.identifier.issn0962-4031
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 155753365
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: f347b877-0329-41d9-aa6a-47ef7c8d2798
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464521
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/5565
dc.description.abstractWe determine the optimal combination of a universal benefit, B, and categorical benefit, C, for an economy in which individuals differ in both their ability to work – modelled as an exogenous zero quantity constraint on labour supply – and, conditional on being able to work, their productivity at work. C is targeted at those unable to work, and is conditioned in two dimensions: ex-ante an individual must be unable to work to be awarded the benefit , whilst ex-post a recipient must not subsequently work. However, the ex-ante conditionality may be imperfectly enforced due to Type I(false rejection) and Type II (false award) classification errors, whilst, in addition, the ex post conditionality may be imperfectly enforced. If there are no classification errors – and thus no enforcement issues – it is always optimal to set C>0, whilst B=0 only if the benefit budget is sufficiently small. However, when classification errors occur, B=0 only if there are no Type I errors and the benefit budget is sufficiently small, while the conditions under which C>0 depend on the enforcement of the ex-post conditionality. We consider two discrete alternatives. Under No Enforcement C>0 only if the test administering C has some discriminatory power. In addition, social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make each type of error. However, under Full Enforcement C>0 for all levels of discriminatory power, including that of no discriminatory power. Furthermore, whilst social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make Type I errors, there are certain conditions under which it is increasing in the propensity to make Type II errors. This implies that there may be conditions under which it would be welfare enhancing to lower the chosen eligibility threshold – supporting the suggestion by Goodin (1985) to “err on the side of kindness”.
dc.format.extent34
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paperen
dc.rights(c) the author 2014en
dc.subjectCategorical Benefiten
dc.subjectClassification errorsen
dc.subjectEnforcement targettingen
dc.subjectUniversal benefiten
dc.subjectHV Social pathology. Social and public welfareen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHVen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleOptimal universal and categorical benefits with classification errors and imperfect enforcementen
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen


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