Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorUlph, Alistair
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-24T23:01:32Z
dc.date.available2014-05-24T23:01:32Z
dc.date.issued2013-10
dc.identifier.citationUlph , A & Ulph , D T 2013 , ' Optimal climate change policies when governments cannot commit ' , Environmental and Resource Economics , vol. 56 , no. 2 , pp. 161-176 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9682-7en
dc.identifier.issn0924-6460
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 26317881
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: d1893694-82dd-4987-a54a-bf80d662c5a0
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84886592477
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464538
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4818
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the optimal design of climate change policies when a government wants to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the relevant carbon taxes (or other environmental policies) that would incentivise such investment by firms will be set in the future. We assume that the current government cannot commit to long-term carbon taxes, and so both it and the private sector face the possibility that the government in power in the future may give different (relative) weight to environmental damage costs. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect: it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently the current government may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.
dc.format.extent16
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofEnvironmental and Resource Economicsen
dc.rights© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. The final publication is available at link.springer.com.en
dc.subjectClimate changeen
dc.subjectEmissions taxesen
dc.subjectImpact on R&Den
dc.subjectTiming and commitmenten
dc.titleOptimal climate change policies when governments cannot commiten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9682-7
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2014-05-25


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record