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dc.contributor.authorManzini, Paola
dc.contributor.authorMariotti, Marco
dc.identifier.citationManzini , P & Mariotti , M 2014 ' Competing for attention : is the showiest also the best? ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1403 , University of St Andrews , St Andrews .en
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 114545251
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 830c1508-e9f2-4319-a539-f1d8b719d324
dc.description.abstractWe introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then "the showiest is the best": the equilibrium ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alternative is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alternative can be picked most often.
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paperen
dc.rights(c) The author 2014en
dc.subjectConsideration setsen
dc.subjectBounded rationalityen
dc.subjectStochastic choiceen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.titleCompeting for attention : is the showiest also the best?en
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.contributor.sponsorEconomic & Social Research Councilen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen

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