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dc.contributor.advisorHawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
dc.contributor.authorWalker-Dale, Heather
dc.coverage.spatial207en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-13T14:21:55Z
dc.date.available2013-11-13T14:21:55Z
dc.date.issued2013-11-30
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/4196
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and physics. I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’. Part I addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new classifications. In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the distinction is more trouble than it is worth. Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism. I examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ and ‘space material’. I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation relation’ and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms. I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and its substantival framework are misplaced and should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies. Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it. I explore issues of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real’, before an extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories. I also explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area. I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectDimensionen_US
dc.subjectSubstanceen_US
dc.subjectIntrinsic propertiesen_US
dc.subject.lccBD626.W2
dc.subject.lcshMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subject.lcshSpaceen_US
dc.subject.lcshPhilosophy and scienceen_US
dc.subject.lcshSubstance (Philosophy)en_US
dc.subject.lcshDimensionsen_US
dc.titleSpace and its dis-contents : new directions for intrinsicality, substance and dimensionalityen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's licence for re-use is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported