Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
Abstract
In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that
at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should
be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on
debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out
whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing
debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates
about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all
I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case
study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism.
Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds
what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between
tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of
dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to
have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are
substantial.
My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be
dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no
general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the
other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I
offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants
are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus
their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding
is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation.
Type
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
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