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dc.contributor.authorDiasakos, Theodoros
dc.contributor.authorKoufopoulos, Kostas
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T14:31:03Z
dc.date.available2013-10-16T14:31:03Z
dc.date.issued2013-08
dc.identifier.citationDiasakos , T & Koufopoulos , K 2013 ' Efficient nash equilibrium under adverse selection ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper 1313 , no. 1313 , University of St Andrews .en
dc.identifier.issn0962-4031
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 38221489
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 6e58324e-5701-44be-a558-30983f2ebaf9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/4089
dc.description.abstractThis paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson (ECMA, 1983).
dc.format.extent65
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper 1313en
dc.rights(c) 2013 the authorsen
dc.subjectInsurance marketen
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen
dc.subjectIncentive efficiencyen
dc.subjectHG Financeen
dc.subject.lccHGen
dc.titleEfficient nash equilibrium under adverse selectionen
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.description.versionhttps://doi.org/Postprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.urlhttp://ideas.repec.org/p/san/wpecon/1313.htmlen
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/economics/repecfiles/4/1313.pdfen
dc.identifier.urlhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1944825en
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.215.pdfen


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