Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorDiasakos, Theodoros
dc.contributor.authorKoufopoulos, Kostas
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T14:31:03Z
dc.date.available2013-10-16T14:31:03Z
dc.date.issued2013-08
dc.identifier.citationDiasakos , T & Koufopoulos , K 2013 ' Efficient nash equilibrium under adverse selection ' School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper 1313 , no. 1313 , University of St Andrews .en
dc.identifier.issn0962-4031
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 38221489
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 6e58324e-5701-44be-a558-30983f2ebaf9
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4089
dc.description.abstractThis paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson (ECMA, 1983).
dc.format.extent65
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper 1313en
dc.rights(c) 2013 the authorsen
dc.subjectInsurance marketen
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen
dc.subjectIncentive efficiencyen
dc.subjectHG Financeen
dc.subject.lccHGen
dc.titleEfficient nash equilibrium under adverse selectionen
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.urlhttp://ideas.repec.org/p/san/wpecon/1313.htmlen
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/economics/repecfiles/4/1313.pdfen
dc.identifier.urlhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1944825en
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.215.pdfen


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record