A critical discussion of Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism
Abstract
'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to
traditional moral theories.
Type
Thesis, MPhil Master of Philosophy
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