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dc.contributor.advisorSkorupski, John
dc.contributor.authorPedersen, Johnnie R. R.
dc.coverage.spatial124en
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-12T11:43:45Z
dc.date.available2007-06-12T11:43:45Z
dc.date.issued2007-06-20
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/346
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.en
dc.format.extent525528 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subjectNormative questionen
dc.subjectReasonsen
dc.subject.lccBJ1031.P4
dc.subject.lcshEthicsen
dc.title"Why should I be moral?" : a critical assessment of three contemporary attempts to give an extra-moral justification of moral conducten
dc.typeThesisen
dc.contributor.sponsorNordea Danmark Fondenen
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhil Master of Philosophyen
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen


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