Understanding inference

Abstract

In this thesis I am investigating the topic of inference. This involves understanding the nature of inferential justification, namely, what grounds the transition from premises to conclusion within an inference. To achieve this, it is necessary to take a view on how logical content features in the discussion. That is, whether the entailment relation can by itself justify the inferential transition. Does the fact that p entails q justify the inference from p to q? Since inference is a matter of judgement, contemporary philosophers tend to conclude that logical content cannot perform such justification, but rather, an intermediary act is required. To take the most prominent example, rule following is put forth as such an act which can play this theoretical role.

This thesis rejects the assumption that logical content is prior to judgement. To do this, I first examine the difficulties faced by the contemporary thinkers who accept that there is such a priority. I look at two different accounts, one from Paul Boghossian (2012) and one from Crispin Wright (2014), objecting to both. I then turn to two figures, Frege and Wittgenstein, for a historical discussion of the contrast between possible perspectives. I argue that Frege, in his own way, also accepts the assumption that content is prior to judgement. Wittgenstein’s subsequent rejection of Frege’s account shines light on the problems with the assumption, still present in the contemporary debate. I defend the Tractarian view of the relation between content and judgement, that content is fundamentally of a kind to be judged. In arguing for such a view of this historical debate, I also argue for a particular way forward with the contemporary debate.