The I in logic

dc.contributor.author	Russell, Gillian
dc.date.accessioned	2024-07-17T11:30:11Z
dc.date.available	2024-07-17T11:30:11Z
dc.date.issued	2024-07-16
dc.identifier	302895163
dc.identifier	5a960c7b-b670-4db5-9af2-368dae218277
dc.identifier.citation	Russell , G 2024 , ' The I in logic ' , Theoria , vol. Early View . https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12543	en
dc.identifier.issn	0040-5825
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10023/30197
dc.description.abstract	This paper argues for the significance of Kaplan's logic LD in two ways: first, by looking at how logic got along before we had LD, and second, by using it to bring out the similarity between David Hume's thesis that one cannot deduce claims about the future on the basis of premises only about the past, and the so-called "essentiality" of the indexical.
dc.format.extent	21
dc.format.extent	336899
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Theoria	en
dc.subject	Demonstratives	en
dc.subject	Kaplan	en
dc.subject	Logic	en
dc.subject	E	en
dc.title	The I in logic	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. Philosophy	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1111/theo.12543
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed	en