Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorJin, Jim Y.
dc.contributor.authorKobayashi, Shinji
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-30T11:30:12Z
dc.date.available2024-05-30T11:30:12Z
dc.date.issued2024-09-01
dc.identifier302399795
dc.identifier9036304c-a4e5-4c5e-a0d8-7a04b89369e3
dc.identifier85194425624
dc.identifier.citationJin , J Y & Kobayashi , S 2024 , ' Equal tax and equal compensation : a fair and efficient way to save climate ' , Research in Economics , vol. 78 , no. 3 , 100965 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2024.100965en
dc.identifier.issn1090-9443
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:DAE54125F1ACFD6B8C9D5001361ED177
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/29954
dc.description.abstractWe show that “equal tax and equal compensation” (T&C) is fair as justified by the two fairness principles. It differs from any Pigouvian tax with fixed lump-sum payments and can motivate every country to maximize world welfare. It benefits countries with current per capita emissions lower than the world average and would benefit every country when compared with a fair benchmark where emissions are duly penalized and compensated. Subsidizing emission reduction by poll tax is Pareto efficient and Pareto improving over status quo, but unfair. An imperfect T&C with a sub-optimal tax or pyramid taxes can still benefit the world.
dc.format.extent8
dc.format.extent526881
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofResearch in Economicsen
dc.subjectClimate changeen
dc.subjectFairnessen
dc.subjectEfficiencyen
dc.subjectPareto improvementen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectSDG 13 - Climate Actionen
dc.subjectMCCen
dc.titleEqual tax and equal compensation : a fair and efficient way to save climateen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Economics (Business School)en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.rie.2024.100965
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record