Conceptual baggage and how to unpack it

Abstract

Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, navigate, and communicate about our shared world. These resources not only carve the world up into categories, but also guide how we, individually and collectively, are oriented towards it. In this thesis, I examine how these resources, and the dispositions they guide, may be harmful. A vital kind of interpretive resources are frames, which equip us with unified perspectives on the world. Perspectives are suites of open-ended interpretive (inquisitive, attentional, inferential, evaluative, and affective) dispositions. Frames thereby guide how we interpret, respond to, and navigate the world. I show that these perspectives are epistemically powerful and indispensable. I argue that flawed perspectives, and the distorting frames that produce them, are deeply pernicious and I examine their relationship to oppression. In Chapter One, I develop an account of how narrative framing may equip us with perspectives. I argue that narratives which frame the overcoming of refusal as erotic may equip viewers with perspectives which obstruct recognition of sexual violence. In Chapter two, I turn more broadly to the way in which our shared interpretive frames may lead us to misunderstand the world. I develop an analysis of these ‘mis-interpretive resources’ and how they may operate to uphold oppression. In Chapter three, I examine how attempts to communicate one’s perspective may be frustrated, analysing how mis-interpretive resources may lead to an overlooked form of communicative disablement. In Chapter four, I examine how distorting frames can be reproduced and argue that attempts to identify injustice can inadvertently replicate distorting frames. Finally, in Chapter five, I consider how we may attempt to revise and replace harmful frames. I argue that, in light of the vital epistemic role of perspective, leveraging frames is an indispensable tool for resisting oppression.