Aristotle on the limits of final causes. The case of extended teleology

Abstract

In this thesis, I discuss the concept of Aristotelian extended teleology (i.e., non-theistic teleological causation in which more than one substance is involved). I argue that some passages of Aristotle’s corpus and Theophrastus’ Metaphysics can be read as arguments of extended teleology. To interpret those passages, I introduce the concept of “axiarchism”, according to which X is actual because X is good. The thesis is composed of five chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce both the doctrine of Aristotle’s four causes and the discussion of the reach of final causes according to the second book of the Physics. In chapter 2, I discuss the teleological arguments that can be found in the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. I argue that some of these arguments can be read as arguments for extended teleology. In chapter 3, I argue that it is reasonable to suppose that, for Aristotle, the sublunary is not a random result of the superlunary and that, therefore, there is some form of order in all the parts of the universe. In this chapter, I focus particularly on Physics VIII, Generation and Corruption II 10. In the fourth chapter, I discuss Metaphysics XII. I defend the view that the tenth chapter of book Lambda can be read as an explicit question about the order and unity of all the parts of the world. In chapter 5, I discuss Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. I argue that Theophrastus is pointing towards the need for an account of extended teleology. He claims that not everything can be the result of a final cause, because some natural phenomena (e.g., the rotation of the sun that causes the yearly seasons) cannot be explained in teleological terms. In questioning the possibility of explaining these phenomena in teleological terms, however, Theophrastus is already thinking in terms of extended teleology.