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dc.contributor.authorRussell, Gillian
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-01T12:30:02Z
dc.date.available2024-03-01T12:30:02Z
dc.date.issued2024-02-28
dc.identifier298102666
dc.identifierd74d0d84-fbd1-41f0-919a-21ace575260f
dc.identifier85186912425
dc.identifier.citationRussell , G 2024 , ' From anti-exceptionalism to feminist logic ' , Hypatia , vol. FirstView . https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.125en
dc.identifier.issn0887-5367
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-6423-0655/work/164894555
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/29398
dc.description.abstractAnti-exceptionalists about formal logic think that logic is continuous with the sciences. Many philosophers of science think that there is feminist science. Putting these together: can anti-exceptionalism make space for feminist logic? The answer depends on the details of the ways logic is like science and the ways science can be feminist. This paper wades into these details, examines five different approaches, and ultimately argues that anti-exceptionalism makes space for feminist logic in several different ways.
dc.format.extent18
dc.format.extent145806
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofHypatiaen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.titleFrom anti-exceptionalism to feminist logicen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/hyp.2023.125
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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