The time we experience : understanding the phenomenologies of temporal passage and presentness

Abstract

This dissertation explores what is involved in the alleged phenomenologies of the passage of time and the present, two phenomenological data that are normally cited to support the A-theory of time. It argues that the phenomenology corresponding to the purported passage phenomenology is that of dynamic changes in things’ states, and the phenomenology corresponding to the purported presentness phenomenology is that of (only) some things and events occurring simpliciter. It claims that these illusory phenomenologies are products of the feature of our perceptual experience of having a confined temporal horizon, which includes three aspects – limited access, involuntariness, and directionality. It also argues that the illusory phenomenologies of dynamic change and things and events occurring simpliciter, despite being at odds with the B-ontology, do not lend support to the A-theory of time. Furthermore, it provides insight into why our perceptual experience has a confined temporal horizon and how the intuitive beliefs that we experience temporal passage and presentness arise from the illusory phenomenologies.