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dc.contributor.authorSnodgrass, J.J.
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-30T11:30:01Z
dc.date.available2023-10-30T11:30:01Z
dc.date.issued2023-10-27
dc.identifier.citationSnodgrass , J J 2023 , ' The co-intension problem : a reply to Rodriguez-Pereyra ' , Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , vol. Online First . https://doi.org/10.5840/tht2023102622en
dc.identifier.issn2161-2234
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 295117533
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: aba75eaa-0317-4f59-b879-0f4d33a50eba
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/28587
dc.description.abstractGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra has presented an objection to the co-intension problem. According to this objection, the examples of properties often cited to motivate the co-intension problem are actually relational properties, and so turn out not to be co-intensional. In this essay, I want to revisit Rodriguez-Pereyra’s objection and explain why I find it defective.
dc.format.extent5
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofThought: A Journal of Philosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Thought Trust. This Open Access article is distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).en
dc.subjectCo-intension problemen
dc.subjectCo-intensional propertiesen
dc.subjectHyperintensional propertiesen
dc.subjectRelational and non-relational propertiesen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleThe co-intension problem : a reply to Rodriguez-Pereyraen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.5840/tht2023102622
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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