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dc.contributor.authorD'Ambrosio, Justin
dc.contributor.authorStoljar, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-26T16:30:10Z
dc.date.available2023-09-26T16:30:10Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-26
dc.identifier.citationD'Ambrosio , J & Stoljar , D 2023 , ' Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs ' , Philosophical Studies . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01992-wen
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 290381140
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 9240c204-79bf-4b45-a066-2fe46c34cc8d
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85172134867
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/28452
dc.descriptionFunding: Australian Research Council (DP170104295).en
dc.description.abstractThere is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they have readings that lack direct objects or themes. The paper further argues that this approach serves not only as a linguistic proposal about the semantics of ‘conscious of’, but also as a proposal about the metaphysics of conscious states.
dc.format.extent22
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2023. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.en
dc.subjectIntensional transitive verbsen
dc.subjectConsciousnessen
dc.subjectAwarenessen
dc.subjectIntensionalityen
dc.subjectHallucinationen
dc.subjectBD Speculative Philosophyen
dc.subjectP Language and Literatureen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBDen
dc.subject.lccPen
dc.titlePerceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01992-w
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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