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dc.contributor.authorD'Ambrosio, Justin
dc.contributor.authorStoljar, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-26T16:30:10Z
dc.date.available2023-09-26T16:30:10Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-26
dc.identifier290381140
dc.identifier9240c204-79bf-4b45-a066-2fe46c34cc8d
dc.identifier85172134867
dc.identifier.citationD'Ambrosio , J & Stoljar , D 2023 , ' Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs ' , Philosophical Studies . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01992-wen
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/28452
dc.descriptionFunding: Australian Research Council (DP170104295).en
dc.description.abstractThere is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they have readings that lack direct objects or themes. The paper further argues that this approach serves not only as a linguistic proposal about the semantics of ‘conscious of’, but also as a proposal about the metaphysics of conscious states.
dc.format.extent22
dc.format.extent659457
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.subjectIntensional transitive verbsen
dc.subjectConsciousnessen
dc.subjectAwarenessen
dc.subjectIntensionalityen
dc.subjectHallucinationen
dc.subjectBD Speculative Philosophyen
dc.subjectP Language and Literatureen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBDen
dc.subject.lccPen
dc.titlePerceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-023-01992-w
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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