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dc.contributor.authorGreenough, Patrick M.
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T08:30:07Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T08:30:07Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-05
dc.identifier.citationGreenough , P M 2023 , ' Is truth consistent? ' , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol. Early View . https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13018en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8205
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 291788414
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 4578b216-3567-4367-9e69-bab5a6aee553
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-5337-8993/work/142064104
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85169793922
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/28318
dc.description.abstractA popular and enduring approach to the liar paradox takes the concept of truth to be inconsistent. Very roughly, truth is an inconsistent concept if the central principles of this concept (taken together) entail a contradiction, where one of these central principles is Tarski’s T-schema for truth: a sentence S is true if and only if p, (where S says that p). This article targets a version of Inconsistentism which: retains classical logic and bivalence; takes the truth-predicate “is true” to pick out a property (and determine a non-empty extension relative to a given world); and holds that liar sentences exhibit a certain kind of indeterminacy in truth-value. Call such a view Modest Inconsistentism since it is somewhat more conservative in its outlook than various other forms of Inconsistentism. Such a modest view has its attractions: we retain the thesis that the liar sentence is meaningful; we get to respect the claims that there are truths and that there is a property of truth; we get to keep classical logic and bivalence; and, prima facie, no strengthened liar paradox is in the offing. The main aim in this paper is to show that Modest Inconsistentism, despite its initial attractions, is in deep trouble—because it does, after all, give rise to a strengthened liar paradox. We shall also see that there are related kinds of theory which are also subject to the same worry.
dc.format.extent18
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Phenomenological Researchen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2023 The Authors. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Philosophy and Phenonmenological Research Inc. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.en
dc.subjectLiar paradoxen
dc.subjectInconsistency theories of the liaren
dc.subjectStrengthened liar paradoxen
dc.subjectIndeterminacyen
dc.subjectHigher-order indeterminacyen
dc.subjectRevenge problemsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectMCPen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleIs truth consistent?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13018
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2023-09-05


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