Saying (nothing) and conversational implicatures
Abstract
I defend an alternative theory of conversational implicatures that does without Grice's notion of making-as-if-to-say. This theory characterises conversationally implicating that p as a way to mean that p by saying that q or by saying nothing. Cases that Grice's theory cannot capture are captured, and cases that Grice's theory misdescribes are correctly described. A distinction between conversational implicatures and pragmatic inferences from what speakers express is required, as well as a non-implicature treatment of figurative speech.
Citation
Tamburini , V 2023 , ' Saying (nothing) and conversational implicatures ' , Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 104 , no. 4 , pp. 816-836 . https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12445
Publication
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0279-0750Type
Journal article
Description
Funding: University of St Andrews.Collections
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