Saying (nothing) and conversational implicatures
MetadataShow full item record
I defend an alternative theory of conversational implicatures that does without Grice's notion of making-as-if-to-say. This theory characterises conversationally implicating that p as a way to mean that p by saying that q or by saying nothing. Cases that Grice's theory cannot capture are captured, and cases that Grice's theory misdescribes are correctly described. A distinction between conversational implicatures and pragmatic inferences from what speakers express is required, as well as a non-implicature treatment of figurative speech.
Tamburini , V 2023 , ' Saying (nothing) and conversational implicatures ' , Pacific Philosophical Quarterly . https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12445
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
DescriptionFunding: University of St Andrews.
Items in the St Andrews Research Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.