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dc.contributor.authorArandjelović, Ognjen
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-26T10:30:14Z
dc.date.available2023-05-26T10:30:14Z
dc.date.issued2023-05-26
dc.identifier286644052
dc.identifier3244ec54-357d-474a-8117-ce8bf46f3061
dc.identifier85163765894
dc.identifier.citationArandjelović , O 2023 , ' Crime and punishment : a rethink ' , Philosophies , vol. 8 , no. 3 , 47 . https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8030047en
dc.identifier.issn2409-9287
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:0529E07194748E0169E6D725A435465F
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/27681
dc.description.abstractIncarceration remains the foremost form of sentence for serious crimes in Western democracies. At the same time, the management of prisons and of the prison population has become a major real-world challenge, with growing concerns about overcrowding, the offenders’ well-being, and the failure of achieving the distal desideratum of reduced criminality, all of which have a moral dimension. In no small part motivated by these practical problems, the focus of the present article is on the ethical framework that we use in thinking about and administering criminal justice. I start with an analysis of imprisonment and its permissibility as a punitive tool of justice. In particular, I present a novel argument against punitive imprisonment, showing it to fall short in meeting two key criteria of just punishment, namely (i) that the appropriate individual is being punished, and (ii) that the punishment can be adequately moderated to reflect the seriousness of the crime. The principles I argue for and that the aforementioned analysis brings to the fore, rooted in the sentient experience, firstly of victims, and not only of victims but also of the offenders as well as the society at large, then lead me to elucidate the broader framework of jurisprudence that I then apply more widely. Hence, while rejecting punitive imprisonment, I use its identified shortcomings to argue for the reinstitution of forms of punishment that are, incongruently, presently not seen as permissible, such as corporal punishment and punishments dismissed on the basis of being seen as humiliating. I also present a novel view of capital punishment, which, in contradiction to its name, I reject for punitive aims, but which I argue is permissible on compassionate grounds.
dc.format.extent20
dc.format.extent325089
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophiesen
dc.subjectIncarcerationen
dc.subjectImprisonmenten
dc.subjectJailen
dc.subjectPrisonen
dc.subjectOffenderen
dc.subjectRetributionen
dc.subjectHV Social pathology. Social and public welfareen
dc.subjectT-DASen
dc.subjectSDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutionsen
dc.subjectMCCen
dc.subject.lccHVen
dc.titleCrime and punishment : a rethinken
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Computer Scienceen
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/philosophies8030047
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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