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dc.contributor.advisorHaddock, Adrian
dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Jack Dylan
dc.coverage.spatial104en_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-11T11:36:23Z
dc.date.available2023-04-11T11:36:23Z
dc.date.issued2023-06-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/27384
dc.description.abstractFrege leaves us with a task: to elucidate the fundamental character of the way in which we know which spatio-temporal particular is in question when we use the first person by formulating a semantic account of the first person. This investigation takes up this task, approaching it through the following question, Nagel’s question: is it possible for one to identify oneself as an element of the objective order? After thinking through the insights of Elizabeth Anscombe’s 'The First Person' and examining the collapse of Gareth Evans’ response to the question, the investigation draws on Sebastian Rödl’s 'Intentional Transaction' to answer Nagel’s question in the positive by formulating a semantic account of the first person and, as such, resolves its central task.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectAnalytic philosophyen_US
dc.subjectGerman idealismen_US
dc.subject.lccB808.5M34
dc.subject.lcshAnalysis (Philosophy)en
dc.subject.lcshMetaphysicsen
dc.subject.lcshIdealism, Germanen
dc.titleIdentifying oneself as an element of the objective order : Nagel's question and Evans' responseen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelMastersen_US
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhil Master of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentThe University of Stirlingen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.17630/sta/396


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