Self-deception and its interaction with introspection
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Self-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.
Thesis, MPhil Master of Philosophy
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