The goodness of the virtues and the Sun-like good
Abstract
Does the Longer Way, described but not taken in Plato's Republic, provide understanding that justice and other virtues are good? Sarah Broadie argues that it does not, on the grounds that Socrates and the brothers learn about justice's goodness without taking the Longer Way. I argue that Socrates’ arguments for justice's goodness are not so complete as to make it impossible for philosopher-rulers to gain from the Longer Way greater understanding of the same point. My main textual evidence is a passage of Book IX (589b–c), a summary that has been widely underappreciated.
Citation
Long , A 2023 , ' The goodness of the virtues and the Sun-like good ' , British Journal for the History of Philosophy , vol. 31 , no. 6 , pp. 1260-1268 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2168252
Publication
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0960-8788Type
Journal item
Collections
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