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dc.contributor.advisorClark, Peter
dc.contributor.authorFolina, Janet
dc.coverage.spatial248en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-08T14:12:15Z
dc.date.available2012-06-08T14:12:15Z
dc.date.issued1986
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2703
dc.description.abstractThe primary concern of this thesis is to investigate the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's negative thesis, which is based on constructivist sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains a classical conception of the mathematical continuum. The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition. I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics. Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides a viable alternative in contemporary debates in the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori intuitions, and which describes a position in between the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be true.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subject.lcshQA9.P7F7
dc.subject.lcshMathematics--Philosophyen_US
dc.titlePoincaré's philosophy of mathematicsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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