Intentionality in the second person : an evolutionary perspective
Abstract
In this paper I address the relation between second person and third person attributions of mental states suggesting that, in their simpler forms, both the second and the third person have in common the possibility of non-inferential attribution via embodied mentalism. Such public availability and transparency is not distinctive of, or derived from, second person attributions, but a property of embodied mentalism irrespective of the “person” it is expressed in. Moreover, I will argue that second person intentional relations, like their third person counterparts, contain opaque mentalistic elements. These are not due to their combination with third person attributions, but are primary constituents of the second person. Indeed, learning about the opacity of mental states may be one of the outcomes and benefits of second person interaction. What is distinctive of second person attributions is the peculiar structure of the intentional relations they generate. In reciprocal interactions between two organisms, which have a long evolutionary history (e.g., mating, predator/prey interactions), two lines of intentionality collide generating, on the one hand, an interactive structure that contains implicitly the cognitive structure of Gricean intentionality, and on the other a set of unique first-person (“ostensive”) experiences that derive from a long evolutionary history of behavioural and expressive mechanisms linked to social interaction. I develop these ideas in the framework of an outline of the evolutionary origins of second person intentionality in nonhuman animals and how it led to the sort of second person intentionality that occurs in human interaction and communication.
Citation
Gomez , J-C 2022 , ' Intentionality in the second person : an evolutionary perspective ' , Teorema , vol. 41 , no. 2 , pp. 49-64 . < https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=8601303 >
Publication
Teorema
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0210-1602Type
Journal article
Rights
Copyright © 2022 The Author. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the final published version of the work, which was originally published at https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=8601303.
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