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dc.contributor.authorCimpeanu, Theodor
dc.contributor.authorDi Stefano, Alessandro
dc.contributor.authorPerret, Cedric
dc.contributor.authorHan, The Anh
dc.identifier.citationCimpeanu , T , Di Stefano , A , Perret , C & Han , T A 2023 , ' Social diversity reduces the complexity and cost of fostering fairness ' , Chaos, Solitons and Fractals , vol. 167 , 113051 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 282909832
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 72507972-1931-4b75-9d69-512a21bd6fad
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:FBBD6BE8C9AC46E954D57D1B261C2FCE
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85145980421
dc.description.abstractInstitutions and investors are constantly faced with the challenge of appropriately distributing endowments. No budget is limitless and optimising overall spending without sacrificing positive outcomes has been approached and resolved using several heuristics. To date, prior works have failed to consider how to encourage fairness in a population where social diversity is ubiquitous, and in which investors can only partially observe the population. Herein, by incorporating social diversity in the Ultimatum game through heterogeneous graphs, we investigate the effects of several interference mechanisms which assume incomplete information and flexible standards of fairness. We quantify the role of diversity and show how it reduces the need for information gathering, allowing us to relax a strict, costly interference process. Furthermore, we find that the influence of certain individuals, expressed by different network centrality measures, can be exploited to further reduce spending if minimal fairness requirements are lowered. Our results indicate that diversity changes and opens up novel mechanisms available to institutions wishing to promote fairness. Overall, our analysis provides novel insights to guide institutional policies in socially diverse complex systems.
dc.relation.ispartofChaos, Solitons and Fractalsen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (
dc.subjectCost efficiencyen
dc.subjectDecision makingen
dc.subjectUltimatum gameen
dc.subjectSocial diversityen
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theoryen
dc.subjectQA Mathematicsen
dc.titleSocial diversity reduces the complexity and cost of fostering fairnessen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Applied Mathematicsen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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