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dc.contributor.advisorPummer, Theron
dc.contributor.advisorCosta-Gomes, Miguel
dc.contributor.authorSchönegger, Philipp
dc.coverage.spatial232 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-13T12:09:58Z
dc.date.available2022-12-13T12:09:58Z
dc.date.issued2023-06-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/26584
dc.description.abstractThis thesis investigates moral decision-making from the two disciplinary angles of philosophy and economics. Moral decision-making includes moral judgements (e.g., judgements as to the moral (im-)permissibility of actions) and moral behaviour (e.g., charitable giving). The topic choice throughout this thesis was primarily motivated by global priorities research, ranging from population ethics to effective charitable giving. The first three chapter primarily focus on experimental philosophy. In them, I (a) investigate the relationship between the dark triad personality traits, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism and anti-natalist views, finding that those high on dark triad traits are significantly more likely to endorse anti-natalist views. I also find that this relationship is mediated by depression. Then, I (b) study reflective equilibrium behaviour in the context of population ethics, finding that in accordance with theory, concrete case judgements play a revisionary role with respect to endorsements of general moral principles. Further, I (c) argue that research in psychology and experimental philosophy has not adequately dealt with the issue of incentivisation. I then go on to conduct an empirical showcase of the Bayesian Truth Serum in this context, demonstrating impacts on response behaviour. The last three chapters focus on experimental economics. I (d) analyse charitable giving behaviour under normative uncertainty and show that randomly allocated expert advice is undervalued by donors, though can impact donation behaviour and reduce uncertainty. Then, I (e) investigate the effect of morally demanding charitable solicitations on donor behaviour, finding that while moral arguments raise donations, increases of moral demandingness do not. Lastly, I (f) analyse the predictors of donating to probabilistic and ambiguous charities as opposed to more reliable ones, failing to find an impact of risk and ambiguity uncertainty. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this thesis is able to advance global priorities research into these topics.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectJudgement and decision-makingen_US
dc.subjectExperimental philosophyen_US
dc.subjectExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subjectBehavioural economicsen_US
dc.subjectSocial and personality psychologyen_US
dc.subjectCharitable givingen_US
dc.subjectDark triaden_US
dc.subjectReflective equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectIncentivisationen_US
dc.titleMoral decision-making : essays from philosophy and economicsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorForethought Foundation for Global Priorities Researchen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorCenter for Effective Altruism (CEA)en_US
dc.contributor.sponsorGiving What We Can (GWWC)en_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.rights.embargodate2027-11-25
dc.rights.embargoreasonThesis restricted in accordance with University regulations. Restricted until 25th November 2027en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.17630/sta/238


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