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dc.contributor.authorGodinez, Jose
dc.contributor.authorSanchez-Barrios , Luis
dc.contributor.authorBandeira de Mello, Rodrigo
dc.contributor.authorKhalik, Mahmoud
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-03T00:40:59Z
dc.date.available2022-12-03T00:40:59Z
dc.date.issued2021-06-03
dc.identifier274531743
dc.identifiera1d4252a-9451-4ea3-addc-142228d173f4
dc.identifier85107492726
dc.identifier.citationGodinez , J , Sanchez-Barrios , L , Bandeira de Mello , R & Khalik , M 2021 , ' Familiarity does not breed contempt : curbing subsidiary corruption through a legitimacy-enhanced ownership structure ' , Latin American Business Review , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/10978526.2021.1932518en
dc.identifier.issn1097-8526
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5690-2140/work/95418590
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/26538
dc.description.abstractWe analyze how the choice of firm ownership structure mitigates the effect of high dependence on a corrupt host government when investing abroad. We draw on a unique dataset of subsidiary-level engagement in corruption of 175 foreign subsidiaries entering three Central American countries. We found that there are two mechanisms to mitigate corrupt behavior when a subsidiary is dependent on a corrupt host government: internal legitimacy that accrues to wholly-owned subsidiaries, and external legitimacy built through a strong regional presence. The effect of dependency on a corrupt host government can be mitigated by enacting internal and external legitimacies.
dc.format.extent411096
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofLatin American Business Reviewen
dc.subjectSubsidiary-level corruptionen
dc.subjectOwnership structureen
dc.subjectResource dependenceen
dc.subjectCentral Americaen
dc.subjectHD28 Management. Industrial Managementen
dc.subjectE-DASen
dc.subjectSDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutionsen
dc.subjectACen
dc.subject.lccHD28en
dc.titleFamiliarity does not breed contempt : curbing subsidiary corruption through a legitimacy-enhanced ownership structureen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Managementen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/10978526.2021.1932518
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2022-12-03


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