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dc.contributor.authorProkop, Mirko
dc.identifier.citationProkop , M 2022 , ' Hans Jonas and the phenomenological continuity of life and mind ' , Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences , vol. First Online .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 282079831
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 8d8e961c-3b42-469a-b46b-bf90cb625a4e
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:CDC3D1FE2495EFA38EC2D2088658EE09
dc.identifier.otherRIS: Prokop2022
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85141558877
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000880237000001
dc.descriptionFunding: The research leading to this paper received financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD, Scholarship ID: 57503736) and an Accommodation Award of £1,500 (GBP) by the University of St Andrews.en
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers a novel interpretation of Hans Jonas’ analysis of metabolism, the centrepiece of Jonas’ philosophy of organism, in relation to recent controversies regarding the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity as understood within ‘autopoietic’ enactivism (AE). Jonas’ philosophy of organism chiefly inspired AE’s development of what we might call ‘the phenomenological life-mind continuity thesis’ (PLMCT), the claim that certain phenomenological features of human experience are central to a proper scientific understanding of both life and mind, and as such central features of all living organisms. After discussing the understanding of PLMCT within AE, and recent criticisms thereof, I develop a reading of Jonas’ analysis of metabolism, in light of previous commentators, which emphasizes its systematicity and transcendental flavour. The central thought is that, for Jonas, the attribution of certain phenomenological features is a necessary precondition for our understanding of the possibility of metabolism, rather than being derivable from metabolism itself. I argue that my interpretation strengthens Jonas’ contribution to AE’s justification for ascribing certain phenomenological features to life across the board. However, it also emphasises the need to complement Jonas’ analysis with an explanatory account of organic identity in order to vindicate these phenomenological ascriptions in a scientific context.
dc.relation.ispartofPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciencesen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2022. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit
dc.subjectHans Jonasen
dc.subjectPhilosophy of biologyen
dc.subjectLife-mind continuityen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleHans Jonas and the phenomenological continuity of life and minden
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. University of St Andrewsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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