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dc.contributor.authorGaut, Berys
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-27T09:30:01Z
dc.date.available2022-10-27T09:30:01Z
dc.date.issued2022-10-18
dc.identifier278763593
dc.identifierc43bf336-a554-4c79-8729-bab42b18191f
dc.identifier.citationGaut , B 2022 , ' Group creativity ' , Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , vol. 92 , pp. 5-26 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246122000145en
dc.identifier.issn1358-2461
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-4966-5874/work/121753636
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/26257
dc.description.abstractGroup creativity is vital in overcoming the numerous challenges that the world faces. Yet group creativity is deeply puzzling. It seems plausible that only agents can be creative, so group creativity requires group agency. But how could groups possess the mental states required to be agents, let alone the rich range of them required to be creative? It appears more reasonable to hold that group creativity is not a real phenomenon, but is merely the summed creativity of the individuals forming the group. There is also much empirical evidence that groups are no more creative than their members. In this paper I examine the conceptual and empirical challenges to group creativity, defend its existence, and offer an explanation of how it is possible.
dc.format.extent302112
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplementsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleGroup creativityen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S1358246122000145
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2022-10-18


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