Show simple item record

Files in this item


Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorGaut, Berys
dc.identifier.citationGaut , B 2022 , ' Group creativity ' , Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , vol. 92 , pp. 5-26 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 278763593
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: c43bf336-a554-4c79-8729-bab42b18191f
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-4966-5874/work/121753636
dc.description.abstractGroup creativity is vital in overcoming the numerous challenges that the world faces. Yet group creativity is deeply puzzling. It seems plausible that only agents can be creative, so group creativity requires group agency. But how could groups possess the mental states required to be agents, let alone the rich range of them required to be creative? It appears more reasonable to hold that group creativity is not a real phenomenon, but is merely the summed creativity of the individuals forming the group. There is also much empirical evidence that groups are no more creative than their members. In this paper I examine the conceptual and empirical challenges to group creativity, defend its existence, and offer an explanation of how it is possible.
dc.relation.ispartofRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplementsen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2022. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleGroup creativityen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record