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dc.contributor.authorBrown, Jessica Anne
dc.identifier.citationBrown , J A 2022 , ' Group evidence ' , Philosophical Issues , vol. 32 , no. 1 , 12220 , pp. 164-179 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 279710840
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 87bbc4e9-f4f4-438a-b4ea-e654abc4c6ce
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-1149-4814/work/121312437
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000868829800001
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85139837635
dc.descriptionFunding: Leverhulme Trust (Grant Number(s): MRF-2020-035).en
dc.description.abstractTo date, most work in group epistemology has focused on group doxastic states such as belief, justified belief and knowledge. But an important question for group epistemology is the nature of group evidence. For, a subject's evidence affects whether her beliefs and actions are justified. For instance, if a subject receives evidence that these are poisonous mushrooms, then that affects whether she is justified in continuing to believe that they are not poisonous and justified in feeding them to her children. Similar points apply at the group level. If the government's evidence supports that its new policy is harming the environment, then that affects whether the government is justified in believing that its policy is not harming the environment and whether it is justified in continuing with the policy. Fortunately, the question of group evidence is beginning to receive attention (e.g. Buchak & Pettit, 2015; Hedden, 20192). Here, I argue against a summative account of group evidence and in favour of a non-summative account. I start in the next section by sketching the assumptions about evidence that underpin the argument. In section 3, I distinguish summative and non-summative approaches to group evidence. In section 4, I argue against summative accounts of group evidence before defending a non-summative approach in sections 5–6, 5–6.
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Issuesen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2022 The Authors. Philosophical Issues published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.en
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleGroup evidenceen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorThe Leverhulme Trusten
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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