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dc.contributor.authorBrown, Jessica
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-27T12:30:02Z
dc.date.available2022-07-27T12:30:02Z
dc.date.issued2022-07-21
dc.identifier277436509
dc.identifier20262986-2488-4cf5-aee4-8341ce7dc079
dc.identifier85135806159
dc.identifier.citationBrown , J 2022 , ' Group excuse from blameless ignorance ' , Philosophical Topics , vol. 49 , no. 2 , pp. 1-16 . https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149212en
dc.identifier.issn0276-2080
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-1149-4814/work/116597951
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/25725
dc.descriptionThanks to the Leverhulme Trust for a Major Research Fellowship to work on group responsibility.en
dc.description.abstractWe routinely treat groups, such as governments and corporations, as agents with beliefs and aims who are morally responsible for their actions. For instance, we might blame the government for its response to the coronavirus pandemic. If groups are morally responsible agents, then it’s plausible that they can have an excuse for wrongdoing from ignorance in just the way individuals can. For instance, a government might attempt to excuse its performance in the coronavirus pandemic by saying that it didn’t know how infectious the new variant was. In this paper, I assume that groups are morally responsible agents to develop an account of what it is for a group to have an excuse from blameless ignorance.
dc.format.extent256433
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Topicsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleGroup excuse from blameless ignoranceen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorThe Leverhulme Trusten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.5840/philtopics202149212
dc.description.statusNon peer revieweden
dc.identifier.grantnumberen


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