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'Trusting-to' and 'trusting-as' : a qualitative account of trustworthiness
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dc.contributor.author | Kelsall, Joshua James Clarke | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-07-05T14:30:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-07-05T14:30:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-05-24 | |
dc.identifier | 279475935 | |
dc.identifier | d2b076f8-ba8c-4713-b557-3edd9fa79e23 | |
dc.identifier | 000799850600001 | |
dc.identifier | 85131010405 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Kelsall , J J C 2022 , ' 'Trusting-to' and 'trusting-as' : a qualitative account of trustworthiness ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075456 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-174X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25607 | |
dc.description | This research was supported by generous funding from the Society for Applied Philosophy’s Doctoral Bursary awards. | en |
dc.description.abstract | Philosophical accounts of trustworthiness typically define trustworthiness as an agent being reliable in virtue of a specific motivation such as goodwill. The underlying thought motivating this view is that to be trustworthy is to be more than merely reliable. If motivational accounts are correct, this is a problem for non-motivational accounts of trustworthiness, as motivations are not required for trustworthiness. In this paper, I defend the non-motivational approach to trustworthiness and show that the motivational approach is inadequate. I do this by making a novel distinction between trusting-to and trusting-as relations. A trusting-to relation is a relation in which a trustor ‘X’ trusts the trustee ‘Y’ to do something. Trusting-as relations are an overlooked relation implicit in all trusting-to relations. They describe the social relationship that holds between X and Y. I will argue that trusting-as relations determine whether any specific motivations are required for trustworthiness trusting-to relations. Thus, I show that acknowledging trusting-as relations enables us to provide a satisfactory explanation of the motivation intuition without making specific motivations constitutive features of trust. | |
dc.format.extent | 25 | |
dc.format.extent | 2033629 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy | en |
dc.subject | Philosophy of trust | en |
dc.subject | Trustworthiness | en |
dc.subject | Motivations | en |
dc.subject | Commitments | en |
dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | en |
dc.subject | T-NDAS | en |
dc.subject | NIS | en |
dc.subject.lcc | B1 | en |
dc.title | 'Trusting-to' and 'trusting-as' : a qualitative account of trustworthiness | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. University of St Andrews | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075456 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
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