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dc.contributor.authorKelsall, Joshua James Clarke
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-05T14:30:31Z
dc.date.available2022-07-05T14:30:31Z
dc.date.issued2022-05-24
dc.identifier.citationKelsall , J J C 2022 , ' 'Trusting-to' and 'trusting-as' : a qualitative account of trustworthiness ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075456en
dc.identifier.issn0020-174X
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 279475935
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: d2b076f8-ba8c-4713-b557-3edd9fa79e23
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000799850600001
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85131010405
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/25607
dc.descriptionThis research was supported by generous funding from the Society for Applied Philosophy’s Doctoral Bursary awards.en
dc.description.abstractPhilosophical accounts of trustworthiness typically define trustworthiness as an agent being reliable in virtue of a specific motivation such as goodwill. The underlying thought motivating this view is that to be trustworthy is to be more than merely reliable. If motivational accounts are correct, this is a problem for non-motivational accounts of trustworthiness, as motivations are not required for trustworthiness. In this paper, I defend the non-motivational approach to trustworthiness and show that the motivational approach is inadequate. I do this by making a novel distinction between trusting-to and trusting-as relations. A trusting-to relation is a relation in which a trustor ‘X’ trusts the trustee ‘Y’ to do something. Trusting-as relations are an overlooked relation implicit in all trusting-to relations. They describe the social relationship that holds between X and Y. I will argue that trusting-as relations determine whether any specific motivations are required for trustworthiness trusting-to relations. Thus, I show that acknowledging trusting-as relations enables us to provide a satisfactory explanation of the motivation intuition without making specific motivations constitutive features of trust.
dc.format.extent25
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofInquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.en
dc.subjectPhilosophy of trusten
dc.subjectTrustworthinessen
dc.subjectMotivationsen
dc.subjectCommitmentsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.title'Trusting-to' and 'trusting-as' : a qualitative account of trustworthinessen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. University of St Andrewsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075456
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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