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dc.contributor.authorPummer, Theron
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-30T23:39:19Z
dc.date.available2022-06-30T23:39:19Z
dc.date.issued2021-07-01
dc.identifier270558750
dc.identifierbbcd49b1-c32c-4de5-9d04-c9707eb9d65d
dc.identifier000661538300003
dc.identifier85108118106
dc.identifier.citationPummer , T 2021 , ' Impermissible yet praiseworthy ' , Ethics , vol. 131 , no. 4 , pp. 697–726 . https://doi.org/10.1086/713953en
dc.identifier.issn0014-1704
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-0147-9917/work/96489593
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/25593
dc.description.abstractIt is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, not praiseworthy. I argue that unexcused impermissible acts can be not only pro tanto praiseworthy but also overall praiseworthy—and even more so than permissible alternatives. For example, there are cases in which it is impermissible to, at great cost to yourself, rescue fewer rather than more strangers, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissibly rescuing no one. I develop a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can so radically come apart from deontic status.
dc.format.extent776856
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofEthicsen
dc.subjectBJ Ethicsen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBJen
dc.titleImpermissible yet praiseworthyen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for the Study of Philanthropy & Public Gooden
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/713953
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2022-07-01
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.philosophersannual.org/en


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