Group belief for a reason
Abstract
In this paper I investigate what it is for a group to believe something for a reason. I defend a non-summative account on which a group can believe that p for a reason even though none of its members believe that p for that reason. By contrast, a summative account would hold that the reason for which a group believes that p is a function of the reason(s) for which its members believe that p. I argue that the proposed non-summative account deals better with cases in which members of a group believe that p for different reasons. I also defend it against a range of objections, including that it conflicts with epistemic norms for assertion and action.
Citation
Brown , J 2022 , ' Group belief for a reason ' , Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume , vol. 96 , no. 1 , pp. 1-22 . https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akac004
Publication
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0309-7013Type
Journal article
Collections
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