Organizational culture, competition and bank loan loss provisioning
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This paper investigates how banks with different organizational cultures (defined as either control-dominant, collaborate-dominant, compete-dominant, create-dominant) manage their loan loss provisions (LLPs) in response to intensified industry competition. For identification, we utilize the change in state-level competition that followed the passage of the US Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that banks with a collaborate-dominant organizational culture are less likely to exercise discretion over LLPs. In contrast, banks with compete- and create-dominant organizational cultures are more likely to utilize discretionary LLPs when competition increases. Moreover, banks use discretionary LLPs to smooth income and signal private information to outsiders. Banks with collaborate-dominant organizational cultures exhibit less income smoothing. Counterparts with a create-dominant organizational culture use discretionary LLPs to signal information to outside stakeholders. Finally, banks with a create-dominant organizational culture are more likely to be subject to formal regulatory enforcement actions.
Luu , H N , Wilson , J & Nguyen , L 2022 , ' Organizational culture, competition and bank loan loss provisioning ' , European Journal of Finance , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2022.2053732
European Journal of Finance
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