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dc.contributor.authorO'Madagain, Cathal
dc.contributor.authorHelming, Katharina A.
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Marco F. H.
dc.contributor.authorShupe, Eli
dc.contributor.authorCall, Josep
dc.contributor.authorTomasello, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-24T09:40:59Z
dc.date.available2022-03-24T09:40:59Z
dc.date.issued2022-03-30
dc.identifier278113893
dc.identifierc9cfa5b9-5022-441f-8c5d-2ffbcd5b98f4
dc.identifier35317676
dc.identifier85126838002
dc.identifier000784192600005
dc.identifier.citationO'Madagain , C , Helming , K A , Schmidt , M F H , Shupe , E , Call , J & Tomasello , M 2022 , ' Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions ' , Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences , vol. 289 , no. 1971 , 20212686 . https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686en
dc.identifier.issn0962-8452
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-8597-8336/work/110423292
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/25080
dc.description.abstractSeveral species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make –revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. But we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting a prior belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to look for more information before deciding. They did not just register their own uncertainty, but attempted to resolve the contradiction between their belief and the new evidence, indicating rational monitoring of the decision-making process. Children did the same at five years of age, but not at three. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward’s location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even three-year old children looked for more information, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.
dc.format.extent6
dc.format.extent241894
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciencesen
dc.subjectRational monitoringen
dc.subjectGreat-apesen
dc.subjectChildrenen
dc.subjectDecision-makingen
dc.subjectInformation-seekingen
dc.subjectMetacognitive monitoringen
dc.subjectBF Psychologyen
dc.subjectDASen
dc.subject.lccBFen
dc.titleGreat apes and human children rationally monitor their decisionsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Social Learning & Cognitive Evolutionen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Psychology and Neuroscienceen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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