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dc.contributor.authorKaspers, Tom
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-01T09:30:01Z
dc.date.available2022-03-01T09:30:01Z
dc.date.issued2022-02-28
dc.identifier.citationKaspers , T 2022 , ' Alethic pluralism for pragmatists ' , Synthese , vol. 200 , no. 1 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03558-5en
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 277903547
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 1ab7bf31-5136-4549-b9d9-1a2cee367a60
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85125654655
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000768294000008
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/24968
dc.description.abstractPragmatism and the correspondence theory of truth are longtime foes. Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made that pragmatists must embrace truth as correspondence. I show that there is a distinctive pragmatic utility to taking truth to be correspondence, and I argue that it would be inconsistent for pragmatists to accept the utility of the belief that truth is correspondence while resisting the premise that this belief is correct. In order to show how pragmatists can embrace truth as correspondence, I develop a kind of alethic pluralism, which treats pragmatist truth as theoretically fundamental to truth as correspondence. This theoretical fundamentality of pragmatist truth allows the pragmatist to conditionally accept truth as correspondence for certain discourses without falling prey to the typical pragmatist objections to correspondence. This pluralist account of truth thus allows pragmatists to concede that, for certain domains of discourse, truth is correspondence, without thereby betraying their pragmatist principles.
dc.format.extent19
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofSyntheseen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2022. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.en
dc.subjectPragmatismen
dc.subjectAlethic pluralismen
dc.subjectTruthen
dc.subjectCorrespondenceen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-DASen
dc.subjectNISen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleAlethic pluralism for pragmatistsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. University of St Andrewsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03558-5
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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